Leadership Lessons From the Great Books - On Guerrilla Warfare by Mao Tse -Tung

Hello. My name is Jesan Sorrells, and this is the Leadership

Lessons from the Great Books podcast, episode number

128. The

journalist Walter Durante once quipped that, quote, in

order to make an omelet, you have to break a few eggs, unquote.

Duranty was, of course, talking about the efforts of the Russian

strongman known as Stalin to remake the Soviets

in his own image, But Duranty

didn't realize, of course, at the time that the ultimate egg breaker of the

20th century would ascend the feudal and colonial

peasantry, one of the largest countries on the planet.

We cannot think about the nature of warfare in the 20th century without considering the

nature of revolutionary struggle and, of course,

guerrilla warfare. After all, revolution and resistance

go together. One follows the other, and

political power comes out of the end of a gun.

The long and tragic story of the post World War 1 20th century

is partially one of vast static armies seeking to

crush a people's led rebellion to advance political

aims. And in reaction and response, the other

side of that story features small bands of jihadists,

terrorists, revolutionaries, and guerrillas formed

almost organically, it would seem, to oppose

those large army's goals.

I have said in previous episodes that, quote unquote, the enemy gets a

vote, and the enemy does. But the inevitable and

unstated pushback to this idea is that somehow the level or

the degree of resistance to the use of

mass inflections of political and military power must

somehow match the level, size, and force of the power wielded

unjustly in order to be considered legitimate.

This is a fatally faulty understanding that leaves the door open

to the granular seat of resistance being planted,

watered, and grown. It

turned out, against all odds, that in the 20th century

small resistance, small pushbacks, and small power

mattered quite a bit. And the person,

the individual, the, titular leader who understood

this fact innately and leveraged this fact to secure

himself long term political power over the lives of almost

900,000,000 souls in one of the most populous countries on the

planet is the book who is the

person who wrote the book we are covering today

on the podcast. Today,

we will be pulling. We will be extracting. We will be, dare I

say, in a guerrilla fashion, running

after the leadership lessons

for leaders in the 21st century,

from one of the greatest political leaders of the 20th century

on guerrilla warfare by

Mao Zedong.

Leaders, to engage successfully in guerrilla

operations, you must articulate as a happy

warrior a coherent, and some

would say revolutionary, vision

of the future. And we pick

up from Mao Zedong on Guerrilla Warfare.

The version that I have is translated and with an introduction by

Brigadier General Samuel b Griffith, United States Marine

Corps retired. Looks as though he,

wrote 2 introductions to, to this book.

We will not be covering the introduction. Instead, we're

gonna jump right into what

is guerrilla warfare.

And I quote, in a war of revolutionary character, guerrilla

operations are a necessary part. This is particularly true in a

war waged for the emancipation of a people who would have an assassination. China is

such a nation, a nation whose techniques are undeveloped and whose communications

are poor. She finds herself confronted with a strong and

victorious Japanese imperialism. Under these

circumstances, the development of the type of guerrilla warfare characterized by the quality of

mass is both necessary and natural.

This warfare must be developed to an unprecedented degree and it must coordinate with the

operations of our regular armies. If we fail to do this, we will

find it difficult to defeat the enemy.

These guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They are

but one step in the total war, one aspect of the

revolutionary struggle. They are the inevitable result of the clash

between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reaches the limits of their endurance.

In our case, these hostilities began at a time when the

people were unable to endure any more from the Japanese imperialists.

Lenin, the people in revolution, said, quote, a people's

insurrection and a people's revolution are not only natural but inevitable,

close quote. We consider guerrilla operations as but

one aspect of our total or mass war because they, lacking the

quality of independence, are of themselves incapable of providing a

solution to the struggle.

Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a

weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ

against a more powerful aggressor nation. When the invader pierces

deep into the heart of the weaker country and occupies her

territory in cruel and oppressive manner, there is no doubt

that conditions of terrain, climate, and society in general

offer obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage by those who

oppose him. In guerrilla warfare, we turn these advantages to the

purpose of resisting and defeating the enemy.

During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox

forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular

army. Thus, the regularly organized

troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have

not reached that level of development combine to form the military

power of a national revolutionary war.

There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of

this will be victory.

When we think about revolutionary characters, when

we think about people who lead revolutions,

we should be thinking about Mao

Zedong rather than Lenin or even Stalin.

Mao Zedong, born December 26, 1993, died

September 9, 1976, also known as Chairman

Mao, was a Chinese politician,

revolutionary, and political theorist who founded the People's Republic of

China, the PRC, and led the country from its establishment in

1949 until his death in 1976.

Mao was the son of a peasant raised in Shaoshan Hunan

and, apparently his father was rather

brutal with him, demanding that he get an

appropriate education, which he, of

course, did. Now

being born in 18/93, there was a lot of things happening in East

Asia, boxer rebellions, and, of course, the

aftermath of World War 1. And,

he, went to Peking University. And while working as

a librarian at Peking University, he adopted

Marxism Lex Marxist Leninism, and in

1921 became a founding member of the Chinese Communist

Party. He helped establish the Chinese Red

Army as first in opposition to the,

to the nationalist, the Comintag, but then later

on in opposition to the Japanese imperialists. This

is the perspective that he wrote, on guerrilla warfare

from. But then after the war was over

in the 19 forties, he turned his revolutionary

army onto the Comatog and drove them

out to the island of Taiwan.

By the way, that's gonna come back later to haunt us.

He helped establish the, the the

Chinese Red Army as a result, as I already said, and he developed a

coherent and principled we'll talk more about principles

today as well, but a coherent and principled strategy, of

guerrilla warfare. He laid it all out.

Now with that being said, chairman Mao, it must be

acknowledged, did lead China

through the tumultuous middle part of the 20th century.

Everything from great famines and great purges

all the way to the little red book

and, quite a few struggle sessions. His

policies were responsible for a vast number of deaths. Close

to 100,000,000 people died at his hands, or because

of the ways in which policies that

he advocated for were carried out by his henchmen.

These people were victims of starvation, persecution,

prison labor, mass executions, and, of course,

famine. The Great Leap Forward,

couldn't have happened without there

being enough bread to go around.

Chairman Mao's regime was totalitarian, and just like

Stalin before him and Lenin before him,

Mao Zedong was a totalizing force. He was

principled, but he was totalizing.

Everything bowed to him, and even these days

in China, if you go and you read the Wikipedia

article, which I pulled the majority of the information that I

have from here today, from, If

you go and read the Wikipedia article on him, you will discover

that modern Chinese folks, the modern

Chinese Communist Party, the modern

CCP, struggles with

Mao Zedong's legacy. Yeah.

He, just like Stalin with Russia, he jerked the

Chinese out of peasantry and feudalism and into

the 20th century, but he had to kill a lot of people in

order to do it, and he had to be a man of

iron principle during a time when the

United States and the Russians, well,

almost came to blows during that thing that we

all forget that occurred in the middle of the 20th century

called the Cold War. There's a

lesson here for leaders about principles. There's a lesson here for

leaders about strategy. There's a lesson here for leaders about

innovation. But if you get all caught up in the totalitarian

nature of it you will miss the lesson. And don't get me wrong,

I'm not in favor of tyranny, but I am in favor of

learning from everything

and everybody. Back to the book, back to

on guerrilla warfare. We're going to pick it up

with a discussion or chairman Mao's

I shouldn't say chairman Mao Zedong's positions,

on guerrilla warfare in history.

And I quote, guerrilla warfare is neither a product of China nor peculiar

to the present day. From the earliest historical days, it has been a feature of

wars fought by every class of men against invaders and oppressors.

Under suitable conditions, it has great possibilities. The many

guerrilla wars in history have their points of difference, their peculiar characteristics,

their varying processes and conclusions, and we must respect and profit by the experience

of those whose blood was shed in them. What a pity it

is that the priceless experience gained during the several 100 wars waged by the peasants

of China cannot be marshaled today to guide us. Our only experience at guerrilla

hostilities has been that gained from the several conflicts that have been carried on against

us by foreign imperialisms. But that experience should help the fighting

Chinese recognize the necessity for guerrilla warfare and should

confirm them in confidence of ultimate victory.

In September 18 12, the Frenchman Napoleon, in the course of swallowing all of

Europe, invaded Russia at the head of a great army totaling several 100,000

infantry cavalry and artillery. At that time, Russia was weak

and her ill prepared army was not concentrated. The most important phase of her

strategy was the use made of Cossack cavalry and detachments of peasants to

carry on guerrilla operations. After giving up Moscow, the

Russians formed 9 guerrilla divisions of about 500 men each. These

and the vast groups of organized peasants carried on partisan

warfare and continually harassed the French army. When the

French army was withdrawing, cold and starving, Russian guerrillas blocked the way and, in

combination with regular troops, carried out counter attacks on the French rear, pursuing

and defeating them. The army of the heroic Napoleon was

almost entirely annihilated and the guerrillas captured many officers,

men, cannon, and rifles. Though the victory was the result of various factors and

depended largely on the activities of the regular army, the function of the partisan

groups was extremely important. Quote, the

corrupt and poorly organized country that was Russia defeated and destroyed an army led by

the most famous soldier of Europe and won the war in spite of the

fact that her ability to organize guerrilla regimes was not fully developed. At

times, guerrilla groups were hindered in their operations and the supply of equipment in

arms was insufficient. If we use the Russian saying, it

was a case of a battle between, quote, the fist and the ax,

close quote, Ivanov.

From 1918 to 1920, the Russian Soviets, because of the opposition and

intervention of foreign imperialisms and the internal disturbances of white Russian

groups, were forced to organize themselves in occupied territories and fight a

real war. In Siberia and Alishan, in the rear of the

army of the traitor Denikin, and in the rear of the Poles, there are many

red Russian guerrillas. These not only

disrupted and destroyed the communications in the enemy's rear, but also frequently prevented

his advance. On one occasion, the guerrillas completely destroyed a

retreating white army that had previously been defeated by regular red forces.

Kolchak, Denikin, the Japanese, and the Poles owing to the necessity of staving

off the attacks of guerrillas were forced to

withdraw regular troops from the front. Quote, thus not only was the

enemy's power impoverished but he found himself unable to cope with the ever moving

guerrilla, close quote, the nature of guerrilla action.

The development of guerrillas at that time had only reached the stage where

there were detached groups of several 1,000 in strength, old, middle aged and

young. The old men organized themselves into propaganda groups known

as silver haired units. There was a suitable guerrilla activity for the

middle aged. The young men formed combat units and there were even groups for the

children. Among the leaders were determined communists who carried

on general political work among the people. These, although they opposed

the doctrine of extreme guerrilla warfare, were quick to oppose those who condemned it.

Experience tells us that, quote, orthodox armies are the fundamental and

principal power. Guerrilla units are secondary to them and assist in the

accomplishment of the mission assigned to the regular forces, close

quote. Lessons of the Civil War in Russia.

Many of the guerrilla regimes in Russia, gradually

developed until, in battle, they were able to discharge functions of organized

regulars. The army of the famous General Galen was entirely

derived from guerrillas. During the 7

months in 1935 and 36, the Abyssinians lost their war

against Italy. The cause of defeat, aside from the most important

political reasons that there were dissented political groups, no

strong government party, and unstable policy, was a

failure to adopt a positive policy

of mobile warfare.

Mao, in describing guerrilla warfare in history, of

course, talks about the French army's

retreat from the Russian steppes during the Napoleonic

wars, and, of course, ends his analysis with

this quote. If we use the Russian saying, it

was the case of a battle between the fist

and the ax.

Guerrilla strategy, whether it is guerrilla strategy applied

to entrepreneurship and startups or guerrilla strategy applied

to established organizations. Any type of strategy,

that is based in overcoming an incumbent

and in overthrowing their long held chivalis

and rules and ways of, quote, unquote, doing things.

Any strategy that is put forth in a guerrilla manner or

executed in the form of guerrilla tactics,

Any strategy relies on alertness, mobility, and

attack. The gorilla must be alert to the

conditions on the ground, both geographic, but

also economic, social, political, and, of

course, spiritual. The gorilla must be

able to move. The gorilla must not be tied

down to a particular place or even to a particular set of

ideas. And the gorilla is always

attacking. Mau noted this. He said

the gorilla is always attacking from the rear.

Gorilla's strategy relies on adaptability, innovation,

and it also relies on a

hyper level of skin in the game that tends to

defy and flummox mature systems.

Guerrilla warfare, All guerrilla warfare is typically based on the

attaining of political power. Not necessarily

theological power or social power or cultural power,

but political power. Because most of the purveyors

of guerrilla warfare, most of the individuals who engage in guerrilla

warfare are attempting

to create political change via other

means. In many

ways, the tip towards the tyrannical use of power to

control other people and ensure compliance is always just

there on the other side of the revolutionary

Elon and the really drab and

dour uniforms. It is

that compliance that you need in order to get people to,

well, to fight and to die for you. From the silver haired

brigade all the way to the children, Everyone is armed.

Everyone participates. Guerrilla warfare

and the overall guerilla strategy has to involve

mass, which is what Mao started with in on

guerrilla warfare. Mass

though does not necessarily mean large. Mass does not necessarily

mean huge. And that's where we get confused because we think

mass, we think a lot of people. But guess what?

If I wanted to overthrow the country or if I

just wanted to overthrow your business, I wouldn't need a

whole bunch of people. Matter of fact, if I really wanted to start some

problems at Google or Facebook or John

Deere or Toyota or Ford

or even SpaceX, all I would need is a

really dedicated group of

like minded individuals with low numbers.

Leaders need to understand that you don't need

all of these, to paraphrase the comedian Joey Diaz,

motherfuckers out here in order to get shit

done. Leaders need to understand

that all you need is the impact of a historical vision

of where you like to go. You need revolutionary elan for

sure, and you need to keep that level of emotional

engagement at a high level. But you really don't need all these people. You

just need the dedicated few, The proud,

to paraphrase from another segment of our

American military, you need the marines.

But you need to apply that thinking to guerrilla

strategy and guerrilla tactics in

guerrilla warfare. When you lead this

way, when you lead,

when you lead through understanding the impact of history

on your vision, you will not have a disembodied vision. You will have a

vision that actually works. You will have

people who will be excited to kill the enemy, who will be

excited to lean forward into business. They will be

excited to stay long nights and do hard things.

And when you lead this way, you will be leading with your fists.

And leading with your fists, well, you don't

actually have to win the battle with the ax. You just

have to knock it out of the other guy's hand. Back to the

book, back to on Guerrilla Warfare

by Mao Zedong. We're gonna pick

up in a long chapter.

Chapter 1, what is guerrilla warfare? We're going to we're gonna pick up with

some ideas here that, I think you need to have.

And I quote, in guerrilla warfare, slick the tactic of

seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west. Avoid the

solid, attack the hollow, attack, withdraw, deliver a lightning

blow, seek a lightning decision. When gorillas

engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances, harass him when he stops,

strike him when he is weary, pursue him when he withdraws. In gorilla's strategy,

the enemy's rear flanks and other vulnerable spouts are his vital

points. And there, he must be harassed, attacked,

dispersed, exhausted, and annihilated. Only in this way can

gorillas carry out their mission of independent guerrilla action and coordination

with the effort of the regular armies. But in spite of

the most complete preparation, there could be no victory if mistakes are made in the

matter of command. Guerrilla warfare, based on the

principles we have mentioned and carried on over a vast extent of territory in

which communications are inconvenient, will contribute tremendously towards ultimate

defeat of the Japanese and consequent emancipation of the Chinese people.

A careful distinction must be made between 2 types of guerrilla warfare. The

fact that revolutionary guerrilla warfare is based on the masses of the people does not

in itself mean that the organization of guerrilla units is impossible in a

war of counterrevolutionary character. The

second type of guerrilla warfare directly contradicts the law of historical

development. If we fail to differentiate between the two types of guerrilla

hostilities mentioned, it is likely that we will exaggerate their effect when

applied by an invader. We might arrive at the conclusion that, quote, the invader

can organize guerrilla units from among the people, close quote. Such a

conclusion might well diminish our confidence in guerrilla warfare.

As far as this matter is concerned, we have but to remember the historical

experiences of revolutionary struggles. Further,

we must distinguish general revolutionary wars from those of a purely, quote, unquote,

class type. In the former case, the whole people of a nation without regard to

class or party carry on a guerrilla struggle that is an instrument of the national

policy. Its basis is therefore much broader than is the

basis of a struggle of class type. Of a general guerrilla war, it has been

said, quote, when a nation is invaded and the

people become sympathetic to one another and all aid in organizing guerrilla

units, in civil war, no matter to who to what extent

guerrillas are developed, they do not produce the same results as when they are

formed to resist an invasion by foreigners. Civil war in

Russia. Close quote. The one strong

feature of guerrilla warfare in a civil struggle

is its equality of internal purity.

One class may be easily united and perhaps fight with great effect, whereas in a

national revolutionary war, guerrilla units are faced with the problem of internal

unification of different class groups. This necessitates the use

of propaganda. Both types of guerrilla

war are, however, similar in that they both employ the same

military methods. Now let me move a little bit further

forward in this chapter. If in today's struggle, we fail to apply the

historical truths of revolutionary guerrilla war, we will fall into the error of believing

with Tao Hu saying that under the impact of Japanese mechanized

army, quote, the guerilla unit has lost its historical function, close

quote. Jane Shishan writes, in olden days, guerilla

warfare was just part of regular strategy, but there's almost no chance that it could

be applied today. These opinions are harmful. If we do not make

an estimate of the characteristics peculiar to our anti Japanese guerrilla

war, but insist on applying it to mechanical formulas derived

from past history, we are making the mistake of placing our hostilities in the same

category as all other national guerrilla struggles. If we hold

this view, we will simply be beating our heads against the stone wall and we

will be unable to profit from gorilla

hostilities.

You gotta innovate in business like you're a

gorilla or pirate or in

leadership in general. Look, gorillas and pirates,

have many things in common as we can see from that last

clip we just read. They have the ability to rely on

the failure of established incumbents to move quickly, break things, and

take risks. Gorillas and pirates don't care about

history or the historical dialectic either.

They don't care about what came before. They only care

about taking risks. As we know,

innovation is the most overused word in business and

leadership, and innovation really only matters if you're a gorilla willing to

break the bounds of approaches, forms, and even,

well, even break the bounds of rebellion itself.

This is why incumbents from politics to

business, from finance to family,

don't like it when things change, don't like it when a gorilla comes

in and becomes the

vanguard of a revolution.

I love this quote from Vladimir Lenin, evil does not exist in

guerrilla warfare but only in the unorganized and undisciplined activities that

are anarchism are anarchism.

He would probably say anarchism. Point is, and Lyndon was

correct, it is that lack of organization. It is that lack of

discipline that kills guerrilla leadership. It kills

gorillas forward momentum. See,

incumbents think that a gorilla, that a person

coming in who is doing the things that a gorilla

does, that is overthrowing the established

system, they think that that person is undisciplined, unorganized,

or even unfocused.

That is the failure of the incumbents.

That's the failure of incumbents to even think

about what is happening. They

don't understand. They don't appreciate.

And, invariably, they are

overthrown.

The biggest challenge that gorillas represent is a

challenge of delivering chaos. It's the challenge of

taking risks to overthrow an incumbent, and it's the challenge of doing it in a

way where the incumbent is completely and totally taken

by surprise. We saw this most recently

in the, in the most recent

presidential elections in the United States, but

we also have seen it in a lot of other places. We've

seen it in entrepreneurship, and we've seen it in the course of the

last 25 years in the

start up community. Pirates are

organized and disciplined. They take risks. They overthrow

incumbents. Gorillas are organized and disciplined.

But gorillas and pirates differ in one very key way.

Gorillas make sure to use propaganda. They use messaging to ensure

that everyone stays in line. Remember that whole ensuring compliance thing?

They use the messaging because they understand that the both the medium

and the message are important to keep everybody engaged

in the revolution.

Leaders innovate like gorillas and scare

the incumbents like pirates.

So what are we to do with this

information from the few clips that we've read from On Guerrilla

Warfare by Mao Zedong? I would encourage you to pick up the book.

One of the better chapters in it, if you're going to pick it up,

and one of the more highlighted or annotated chapters

that I read in the book was on it was

chapter 5, organization for Guerrilla

Warfare. Could be particularly useful for you if you're looking

to mount an insurrection or overthrow an

incumbent. What can we learn

from what guerrilla warfare did

and what it accomplished in the 20th century

by writing history in iron and blood?

Well, first the caveat. I don't want it to be said that I

am supportive of Marxist Leninism or Marx or or supportive

of communist revolutions. I'm not a communist.

I'm actually an anti anti communist, if

you know what that means. I'm also not in support

of overweening capitalism. I believe we need to have a

moral core inside of our capitalism and our

capitalistic approaches to the environment, to

human capital, to dealing with other people, and to the

the placement of our resources in the world. I do believe

that one of the fundamental problems that has been exposed in the last 25

years of, not only Western culture but

also global culture has been the failure of capitalism to have a

moral core and a moral core

based not on secularism or secular morality but a

moral core based in Christianity.

With that being said, I wanna be very clear. The Marxist approach to

revolution, the Marxist approach to guerilla tactics, the

Marxist approach to piracy, the Marxist approach to innovation

is inherently anti Christian and fundamentally

Luciferian because it focuses on the dissolution and deconstruction

of history, always chasing

a never ending vista of utopia while quote

unquote breaking a few eggs along the way.

I think in the 21st century the

opposition to marxism and leninism is coming,

well, interestingly enough, from the places where marxism and

leninism used to come from small places that are

local. Small and local is the new big

as we have moved past the traumas of the 20th century. And

leaders should pay attention to this. Leaders should

know that leadership is required to reduce the

impact, to reduce the the overweening

power of mass on a on the on the on local

issues and on local incumbencies and

even on local guerrilla factions, leadership is required to reduce

the impact of the national on the local and to reverse

the power of scaling problems to their highest level, which is what

social media brings us rather than dealing with the problem closest to

its source of origin. There's no dopaminergic

reward for solving a local problem.

I think chairman Mao would agree with this next

statement. Skin in the game is vital to any kind of

gorilla strategy, but it's also vital to

any type of business innovation. Discipline is

critical to the evolution of action. If you're not

disciplined, you're just doing things.

Kind of the way the Joker talked about it in The Dark Knight.

I'm just a dog chasing a car. I wouldn't know what to do

with it if I caught it. And

when faced with malevolence, a gorilla must maintain

skepticism in the face of authoritarian,

tyrannical manipulation.

One of the ways that guerilla tactics work is they ensure

compliance. They brainwash people with propaganda. And

that's not to say that we aren't brainwashing our own social media

ways in the appropriate social media ways in our own era and in our own

time, but it is to say that we do live in a free society

where alternative viewpoints can act in a guerilla

fashion not only on your

followers, but also on you.

And that's something to keep in mind if you're gonna go out and be a

pirate or behave like a

gorilla. And

well that's it for me

Creators and Guests

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Host
Jesan Sorrells
CEO of HSCT Publishing, home of Leadership ToolBox and LeadingKeys
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Leadership Lessons From the Great Books - On Guerrilla Warfare by Mao Tse -Tung
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